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Abstract:	The	 purpose	 of	 the	 present	 study	 is	 to	 assess	 the	 ethical	 standards	 of	 Indonesian	
parliamentarians,	 how	 they	 provides	 Indonesian	 MPs	 with	 proper	 cognitive	 guidance,	 to	
identify	what	factors	may	be	responsible	for	variation	in	ethical	standards	and	to	assess	how	
Indonesia	parliamentarians	compare	 to	 legislators	and	policy	makers	 from	other	countries.	
The	 methodological	 approach,	 employed	 in	 each	 of	 these	 studies,	 to	 map	 the	 ethical	
preferences	 of	 parliamentarians	 can	 also	 be	 used	 to	 explore	 how	 the	 ethical	 world	 of	
Indonesian	parliamentarians	has	changed	over	 time,	 in	addition	 to	replicating	 the	analyses	
performed	in	previous	studies	with	a	larger	sample,	the	paper	explored	three	sets	of	questions	
that	previous	studies	had	not	addressed.	First,	we	explored	what	are	some	of	the	correlates	or	
some	 possible	 causes	 of	 individual	 attitudes;	 Second,	we	 assessed	 how	 the	 ethical	 attitudes	
and	standards	of	respondents	shape	the	way	they	perceive	corruption;	Third,	we	performed	a	
similar	 analysis	 with	 data	 collected	 among	 Kazakhstani	 civil	 servants	 to	 test	 whether	 the	
perception	of	corruption	is	influenced	by	ethical	attitudes	also	outside	Indonesia	or	not.	
Keywords:	Ethical	Values,	Perception	of	Corruption.	
	
Introduction	The	 study	 of	 ethical	 values	 and	attitudes,	 of	 how	 they	 affect	 the	implementation	 of	 codes	 of	 conduct,	 of	how	 they	 influence	 the	 performance	 of	civil	 servants,	 of	 how	 they	 bias	 the	perception	 of	 corruption	 has	 a	 long	 or	 a		short	tradition	depending	on	how	broadly	or	 narrowly	 one	 defines	 ethical	 values	and	their	consequences.	In	a	broader	sense	several	political	outcomes	 and	 phenomena	 have	 been	viewed	 as	 the	 product	 of	 ethics,	 ethical	attitudes	 and	 ethical	 values.	 For	 Max	Weber	 the	 rise	 of	 capitalism	 and	 socio-economic	 success	 were	 the	 result	 of	 the	protestant	 ethics,	 for	 Bansfield	 (1958)	ethics,	or,	 to	be	more	precise,	 the	 lack	of	
moral	 values	 was	 socio-economic	backwardness,	 for	 Lipset	 (1959)	 the	survival	 of	 democracy	was	due	 to	 values	and	 a	 attitudes,	 for	 Almond	 and	 Verba	(1963)	 the	 proper	 functioning	 of	 a	democratic	 system	 was	 the	 result	 of	values	 and	 attitudes,	 for	 Putnam	 (1993)	again	attitudes	and	values	were	the	main	determinant	 of	 the	 functioning	 of	democratic	 institutions,	 while	 for	Fukuyama	 (1995)	 attitudes	 and	 values	were	 the	 main	 determinants	 of	prosperity.	 While	 some	 of	 these	 studies	explicitly	mentioned	 ethic,	 ethics,	morals	or	 morality	 (Weber,	 Bansfield)	 ,	 the	political	 culture	 tradition	 from	 Almond	and	Verba	onward	has	preferred	to	speak	of	‘civic	culture’	or	‘political	culture’.		
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But	 in	 so	 far	 as	 political	 culture	one	the	one	hand	and	ethics	on	the	other	hand	 are	 the	 product	 of	 attitudes	 and	values,	 it	 does	 not	 require	 much	‘conceptual	 stretching’	 (Sartori,	 1970)	 to	understand	 that	 the	 two	 terms	 cover	 the	same	 portion	 of	 the	 semantic	 field	(Hjelmslev,	 1953),	 or,	 in	 simpler	 terms,	have	 the	 same	 meaning.	 So	 if	 we	 take	ethics	 to	 have	 a	 broad	 meaning,	 social	scientists	 have	 extensively	 explored	 how	it	 affects	 various	 social	 phenomena	 from	development	 to	 democracy,	 from	electoral	 behavior	 to	 institutional	performance.	In	a	narrower	sense,	however,	 the	literature	 has	 attempted	 on	 the	 basis	 of	survey	 data	 analysis	 to	 map	 the	 ethical	preferences	of	parliamentarians	and	civil	servants	 (Mancuso,	 1995;	 Allen,	 2008;	Pelizzo	 and	 Ang,	 2008a	 and	 2008b),	 to	understand	 how	 ethical	 values	 influence	the	 implementation	 of	 a	 code	 of	 conduct	(Snape	and	Skelcher,	2001),	to	investigate	how	ethical	values	affect	the	performance	of	the	members	of	an	organization	(Bruce,	1994),	and	how	the	adoption	of	a	code	of	conduct	 affects	 the	 ethical	 world	 of	 civil	servants	(Bruce,	1996).		The	 purpose	 of	 the	 present	 study	is	 to	 assess	 the	 ethical	 standards	 of	Indonesian	 parliamentarians,	 how	 they	provides	 Indonesian	 MPs	 with	 proper	cognitive	 guidance,	 to	 identify	 what	factors	 may	 be	 responsible	 for	 variation	in	 ethical	 standards	 and	 to	 assess	 how	Indonesia	 parliamentarians	 compare	 to	legislators	 and	 policy	makers	 from	other	countries.		Our	 analyses	 reveal,	 as	 the	literature	 had	 already	 acknowledged	(Pelizzo	 and	 Ang,	 2008a,	 2008b)	 that	Indonesian	MPs	have	a	plurality	of	ethical	
standards	 and	 that	 these	 standards	 are	used	in	fairly	consistent	fashion.		Our	 analyses	 also	 reveal	 that	 the	perception	 of	 level	 of	 corruption	 in	 the	country	 is	 significantly	 influenced	 by	 the	ethical	 attitudes	 of	 the	 respondent.	 To	further	 corroborate	 this	 claim,	 we	compare	 the	 ethical	 attitudes	 of	Indonesian	 MPs	 with	 those	 of	Kazakhstani	 civil	 servants.	 The	comparative	 analysis	 reveals	 that	 while	Kazakhstani	 civil	 servants	 report	 to	have	less	tolerance	for	unethical	scenarios	than	Indonesian	 parliamentarians,	 the	distribution	 of	 respondents	 across	 the	four	 ethical	 types	 that	we	 identify	 in	 the	course	 of	 the	paper	 is	 virtually	 the	 same	in	 both	 countries,	 and	 that	 in	 both	countries	 the	 perception	 of	 corruption	 is	to	 a	 large	 extent	 shaped	 by	 the	 ethical	attitudes	of	the	respondent.	The	fact	that	the	level	of	perceived	corruption	 is	 a	 function	 not	 only	 of	 how	much	 corruption	 there	 is	 but	 also	 of	 the	ethical	 values	 of	 the	 respondents	 means	that	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 objective	corruption	would	be	judged	differently	in	countries	 that	 hold	 different	 ethical	values	 and	 attitudes.	 Hence,	 to	 make	survey-based	 estimates	 of	 corruption	properly	 comparable	 across	 countries,	 it	is	 essential	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 ethical	attitudes	is	properly	discounted.		While	 the	 literature	 had	 generally	acknowledged	that	ethical	values,	such	as	the	Protestant	ethics	discussed	by	Weber	or	Confucianism,	were	responsible	for	the	entrepreneurial	 behavior	 of	 individuals	and	 for	 socio-economic	 development,	much	 less	 attention	 has	 generally	 been	paid	 to	 how	 the	 functioning	 and	 the	performance	 of	 (public)	 organizations	 is	affected	 by	 the	 (ethical)	 values	 of	 its	
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members.	 From	 the	early	1990s	onward,	however,	 scholars	 have	 somehow	rediscovered	 ‘ethics’	 and	 have	 started	investigating	 whether,	 how	 and	 to	 what	extent	 ‘ethics’	 is	 instrumental	 in	securing	the	 proper	 functioning	 of	 public	organizations,	 the	 productivity	 of	 civil	servants	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	regulations	 such	 as	 the	 codes	 of	 ethics	and/or	the	codes	of	conduct.	Three	 streams	 of	 research	 can	 be	identified.	 One	 stream	 of	 research	 has	generally	 shown	 that	 ‘ethics	 matters’.	Ethical	 values	 affect	 the	 functioning	 and	the	performance	of	public	administration	(Frederickson,	 1993)	 as	 ethical	 people	are	 more	 productive	 employees	 (Bruce,	1994).		Scholars	 working	 in	 this	 line	 of	inquiry	have	hence	argued	 that	 ‘ethics	 in	government’	 should	 be	 promoted,	 that	teaching	ethics	to	public	administrators	is	important	 (Bruce,	 1998),	 that	 the	adoption	 of	 codes	 of	 ethics	 and	 codes	 of	conduct	 can	 promote	 ethical	 behavior	 in	an	organization	(Bruce,	1996;	Pelizzo	and	Stapenhurst,	 2006)	 but	 also	 that	 the	successful	 implementation	 of	 a	 virtue-inducing	code	of	conduct	depends	on	the	ethical	 values	 and	 attitudes	 of	 the	individuals	 for	 whom	 it	 is	 designed	(Skelcher	and	Snape,	2001).	A	 second	 stream	 of	 research	 has	focused	 instead	 on	 how	 ‘ethics’	 in	 the	public	 administration	 can	 be	 promoted	and	 scholars,	 in	 this	 respect,	 noted	 that	the	 promotion	 of	 ethical	 values	 can	 be	achieved	 by	 a	 adopting	 codes	 of	 ethics	and	 codes	 of	 conduct	 	 (Bruce,	 1996),	 by	teaching	 ethics	 to	 public	 administrators	(Bruce,	1998)	or	both.	Teaching	ethics	to	public	 administrators	 is	 important	 in	itself,	but	it	is	also	important	because	it	is	
instrumental	 in	homogenizing	 the	ethical	preferences	of	the	individuals	that	a	code	of	conduct	is	expected	to	regulate.		The	 literature	 (Skelcher	 and	Snape,	 2001)	 made	 clear	 that	 a	 code	 of	conduct	 can	 promote	 ethics	 within	 an	organization	 only	 if	 the	members	 of	 that	organization	 have	 homogeneous	 ethical	preferences,	 that	 is	 whether	 they	 have	 a	common	 understanding	 of	 what	represents	 ethical/unethical	 behavior,	 of	what	 are	 the	 ethical	 dilemmas	 that	 their	organizations	 encounters	 and	 of	 what	solutions	 can	 be	 adopted	 to	 solve	 those	problems.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 such	 a	common	 understanding,	 Skelcher	 and	Snape	argued,	 a	 code	of	 conduct	 is	 going	to	be	somewhat	ineffective.	The	 third	 stream	 of	 inquiry	 has	attempted	to	map	the	ethical	preferences	of	 public	 administrators	 and	 elected	officials.	 This	 mapping	 exercise	 was	conducted	 to	 see	 whether	 and	 to	 what	extent	 ethical	 preferences	 were	homogeneous,	 whether	 and	 to	 what	extent	they	displayed	considerable	cross-country	 variation	 and	 whether	 and	 to	what	 extent	 they	 changed	 over	 time.	Specifically.		After	 Mancuso	 (1995)	 presented	her	 methodology	 to	 map	 the	 ethical	preferences	 of	 British	 parliamentarians,	Allen	 (2008)	showed	 that	 their	 tolerance	for	 unethical	 behavior	 decreased	considerably	 over	 time,	 whereas	 Pelizzo	and	 Ang	 (2008a,	 2008b)	 showed	 that	Indonesian	 legislators	 serving	 on	 the	ethics	committee	of	the	DPD	and	the	DPR	had	 less	 tolerance	 for	 unethical	 conduct	than	 the	 British	 parliamentarians	surveyed	 by	 Mancuso	 (1995)	 in	 her	seminal	work.	The	key	findings	of	this	set	of	studies	are	that	parliamentarians	have	
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indeed	 different	 ethical	 preferences,	 that	ethical	preferences	change	over	time	and	can	 display	 significant	 cross-country	variation.		
Methods		 The	 methodological	 approach,	employed	in	each	of	these	studies,	to	map	the	 ethical	 preferences	 of	parliamentarians	 can	 also	 be	 used	 to	explore	 how	 the	 ethical	 world	 of	Indonesian	parliamentarians	has	changed	over	 time,	 to	 assess	 how	 Indonesian	legislators	employ	their	ethical	standards,	and	 to	 assess	 the	difference	between	 the	ethical	 values	 of	 Indonesian	 legislators	from	 the	 ethical	 values	 of	 Kazakhstani	civil	servants	so	that	even	in	this	study	we	can	map	values	and	their	variation	across	time	 and	 space	 as	 previous	 studies	 had	already	done.		The	 present	 study	 attempts	 to	build	 upon	 the	 existing	 literature,	 not	only	 by	 breplicating	 analyses	 that	 were	already	 conducted	 in	 the	 past	 but	 also,	and	more	 importantly,	 by	 expanding	 the	boundaries	 of	 inquiry.	 Specifically	 we	wish	 to	 show	 that	 ‘ethics’	 matters	 for	reasons	 that,	 to	 the	 best	 of	 our	
knowledge,	the	literature	has	so	far	failed	to	address.	What	we	plan	to	show	is	 that	the	 ethical	 attitudes	 of	 respondents	 do	not	simply	provide	cognitive	guidance	but	also	 affects	 respondents’	 perception	 of	corruption—and	 this	 finding,	 as	 we	 will	argue	 later	 on,	 has	 significant	implications	for	the	comparative	study	of	corruption.			
Result	and	Discussion		The	 dataset	 was	 constructed	 by	administering	to	40	parliamentarians	the	survey	 instrument	 (table	 1),	 originally	designed	by	Mancuso	(1995)	as	amended	by	Pelizzo	and	Ang	(2008),	who		used	it	to	generate	 an	 ethical	 map	 of	 Indonesian	parliamentarians	 (The	 2006	 data	 were	collected	 by	 the	 members	 of	 the	 ethics	committee	 of	 the	 DPR	 and	 the	 DPD	 in	Jakarta.	The	2009	data	were	collected	by	them	 to	 visiting	 research	 fellow	 in	Jakarta).	 Specifically,	 respondents	 were	given	a	list	of	scenarios	(see	table	2),	they	were	 asked	 to	 indicate	 on	 a	 seven	 point	scale	 (1=	 very	 corrupt,	 7	 =	 non	 corrupt)	how	 corrupt/non-corrupt	 they	 believed	each	scenario	to	be.	
	
Table	1	
Mancuso’s	Corruption	Scenarios.	Name	 Text	CAMPAIGN		 A	 cabinet	 minister	 promises	 an	 appointed	 position	 in	exchange	for	campaign	contribution	SCHOOL	 An	MP	uses	his	position	to	get	a	friend	or	relative	admitted	to	Oxford	or	Cambridge,	or	some	other	prestigious	institution	DRIVEWAY	 The	 driveway	 of	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 City	 Council’s	 private	home	is	paved	by	the	council’s	District	Works	Department	CONTRACT	 A	cabinet	minister	uses	his	influence	to	obtain	a	contract	for	a	firm	in	his	constituency	RETAINER	 MP	 arrange	 for	 meetings	 between	 private	 corporation	executives	and	parliamentarians	PLANNING	 A	local	councillor,	while	chairman	of	the	planning	committee,	
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authorizes	a	planning	permission	for	property	owned	by	him	LORRY	 A	Ministry	of	Transport	heavy	good	vehicle	examiners	obtains	£10	from	the	owner	of	a	lorry	to	pass	the	vehicle	SECRETARY	 MP	hires	wife	or	family	member	to	serve	as	his	secretary	GIFT	 MP	accepts	a	crate	of	wine	from	influential	constituent	KNIGHT	 	TRAVEL	 MP	 exchange	 1st	 class	 ticket	 allocated	 for	 economy	 class,	pockets	the	difference	ALL	PARTY	 An	all-party	group	on	 the	aged	secures	 the	services	of	a	 full-time	research	assistant	at	the	expense	of	the	Age-Concern.	ORDER	PAPER	 A	member	on	retainer	to	a	PR	company	representing	a	foreign	government	 submits	 several	written	questions	 for	 the	Order	paper	on	British	industrial	development	in	that	country	PASS	 MP	 gets	 house	 pass	 for	 lobbyist	 to	 act	 as	 research	 assistant	whose	services	paid	for	by	external	source	
Source:	adapted	from	Mancuso	(1995:34)	
	
Table	2		
Corruption	scenarios	used	in	this	study	Name	 Text	Company	donation	 A	company	makes	a	big	donation	to	the	government	party	and	eventually	won	a	major	contract	Campaign	 Cabinet	minister	promises	appointment	position	in	exchange	for	campaign	contribution	School	 MP	 using	 influence	 to	 get	 friend/relative	 admitted	 to	prestigious	institution	Pass	 MP	 gets	 house	 pass	 for	 lobbyist	 to	 act	 as	 research	 assistant	whose	services	paid	for	by	external	source	Influence	job	 MP	using	influence	to	get	friend/relative	a	job	Contract	 Cabinet	minister	 use	 influence	 to	 obtain	 contract	 for	 firm	 in	his	constituency	Travel	 MP	 exchange	 1st	 class	 ticket	 allocated	 for	 economy	 class,	pockets	the	difference	Secretary	 MP	hires	wife	or	family	member	to	serve	as	his	secretary	Retainer	 MP	 arrange	 for	 meetings	 between	 private	 corporation	executives	and	parliamentarians	Gift	 MP	accepts	a	box	of	cigars	from	influential	constituent	
Source:	adapted	from	Mancuso	(1995:34)		 Since	responses	were	recorded	on	a	7-point	scale,	we	can	recode	the	answer	from	1	 to	3	 as	 ‘corrupt’	 and	 the	 answers	from	 5	 to	 7	 as	 ‘non-corrupt’,	 while	respondents	 assigning	 to	 a	 scenario	 the	score	 of	 4	 (neither	 corrupt	 nor	uncorrupt)	 were	 treated	 as	 system	
missing.	By	doing	so	we	are	able	to	assess	how	Indonesian	MPs	assessed	the	various	scenarios	and	how	this	assessment	varied	over	 time,	 that	 is	 depending	 on	whether	MPs	 served	 on	 the	 ethics	 committee	 (as	all	 the	respondents	surveyed	 in	2006)	or	not.	See	table	3.	
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Table	3	
Scenario	Responses	and	Statistics	
	 	 2006	(N=27)	 2009	(N=13)	 Total	(N=40)	
Name	 Scenario	 %	
corrupt	
%	 non-
corrupt	
%	
corrupt	
%	 non-
corrupt	
%	
corrupt	
%	 non-
corrupt	Company	donation	 A	 company	 makes	 a	big	 donation	 to	 the	government	party	and	eventually	 won	 a	major	contract	
96.3	 3.7	 83.3	 16.7	 92.3	 7.7	
Campaign	 Cabinet	 minister	promises	appointment	 position	in	 exchange	 for	campaign	contribution	
91.7	 8.3	 54.5	 45.5	 80	 20	
School	 MP	 using	 influence	 to	get	 friend/relative	admitted	 to	prestigious	institution	
91.7	 8.3	 54.5	 45.5	 80	 20	
Pass	 MP	 gets	 house	 pass	for	 lobbyist	 to	 act	 as	research	 assistant	whose	 services	 paid	for	by	external	source	
90	 10	 81.8	 18.2	 87.1	 12.9	
Influence	job	 MP	 using	 influence	 to	get	 friend/relative	 a	job	 88.5	 11.5	 50	 50	 77.8	 22.2	Contract	 Cabinet	 minister	 use	influence	 to	 obtain	contract	for	firm	in	his	constituency	
87.5	 12.5	 80	 20	 85.3	 14.7	
Travel	 MP	exchange	1st	class	ticket	 allocated	 for	economy	 class,	pockets	the	difference	
77.3	 22.7	 50	 50	 68.8	 31.3	
Secretary	 MP	 hires	 wife	 or	family	 member	 to	serve	as	his	secretary	 76	 24	 66.7	 33.3	 73	 27	Retainer	 MP	 arrange	 for	meetings	 between	private	 corporation	executives	 and	parliamentarians	
47.8	 52.2	 36.4	 63.6	 44.1	 55.9	
Gift	 MP	 accepts	 a	 box	 of	cigars	 from	 influential	constituent	 36.8	 63.2	 61.5	 38.5	 46.9	 53.1	
Source:	adapted	from	Mancuso	(1995:34)	
	The	 data	 presented	 in	 table	 3	suggest	 some	 immediate	 conclusions:	 first,	 that	 some	 scenarios	 are	 nearly	unanimously	perceived	 to	be	 ‘corrupt’	 as	
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in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 ‘company	 donation’	while	 on	 some	 others	 scenarios	 there	 is	some	disagreement	as	to	how	they	should	be	 regarded;	 second,	 that	 on	 some	scenarios	 there	 is	 more	 disagreement	among	 respondents	 as	 to	 whether	 they	should	be	 regarded	as	corrupt	or	not	 (as	in	 the	 case	 of	 both	 the	 retainer	 and	 the	gift	 scenario)	 than	 on	 others	 scenarios;	third,	 that	 the	 members	 of	 ethics	committee	in	2006	had	remarkably	more	stricter	 ethical	 standards	 than	 the	 MPs	
surveyed	 in	 2009;	 and	 fourth,	 that	while	the	way	in	which	a	scenario	is	assessed	is	fairly	 consistent	over	 time	 in	 some	 cases	(company	 donation,	 pass,	 contract,	secretary),	 it	 is	 not	 in	 the	 others.	 By	aggregating	 the	 responses	 collected	 in	2006	 with	 the	 responses	 collected	 in	2009,	and	by	computing	then	the	average	response	for	each	of	the	ethics	scenarios,	we	are	able	to	rank	the	various	scenarios	on	 the	 basis	 of	 how	 ‘corrupt’	 they	 were	perceived	to	be	(See	Table	4).	
	
Table	4	
Scenario	Responses	and	Statistics	Scenario	 mean	 Standard	deviation	 Median	 N	Company	donation	 1.83	 1.583	 1.0	 40	House	pass	 2.46	 1.742	 2.0	 37	Contract	 2.53	 1.679	 2.0	 40	School	 2.68	 1.774	 2.0	 40	Influence	job	 2.90	 1.809	 2.5	 40	Secretary	 2.95	 2.253	 2.0	 40	Campaign	 3.05	 2.064	 3.0	 39	Travel	 3.18	 2.151	 3.0	 39	Gift	 4.23	 2.270	 4.0	 40	Retainer	 4.60	 2.170	 4.0	 40	
Source:	adapted	from	Mancuso	(1995:34)	
	Mancuso	 (1995)	 suggested	 that	some	 of	 the	 scenarios	 she	 had	 identified	should	be	regarded	as	‘conflict	of	interest’	scenario,	 while	 the	 other	 should	 be	regarded	 as	 ‘service’	 scenarios.	Specifically,	school,	contract	and	influence	job	 are	 considered	 as	 ‘service’,	 while	travel,	pass,	gift,	retainer	and	secretary	as	considered	 as	 ‘conflict	 of	 interest’	scenarios.	 By	 computing	 the	 average	across	the	‘service’	scenarios	provided	by	
each	 respondent,	 we	 assess	 the	respondent’s	 tolerance	 for	 service.	Similarly	 by	 computing	 the	 average	across	 ‘conflict	 of	 interest’	 scenario,	 we	assess	 each	 respondent’s	 tolerance	 for	conflict	 of	 interest	 scenarios.	 The	 data	presented	 in	 table	 5	 suggest	 that,	consistently	 over	 time,	 Indonesian	 MPs	have	 higher	 tolerance	 for	 conflict	 of	interest	 scenarios	 than	 for	 service	scenarios.	
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Table	5	
Descriptive	Statistics	on	Conflict	and	Service		 	 2006	(N	=	27)	 2009	(N	=	13)	 Total(N	=	40)	Service	 	 	 	 		 Mean	 2.37	 3.38	 2.7		 Standard	deviation	 1.19	 1.48	 1.36	Conflict	 	 	 	 		 Mean	 3.25	 3.74	 3.52		 Standard	Deviation	 1.18	 1.79	 1.48	
Source:	adapted	from	Mancuso	(1995:34)	
	 These	 additive	 scales	 can	 be	 used	to	 create	 a	 two-dimensional	 mapping	 of	Indonesian	 legislators.	 But	 before	 we	 do	so,	we	want	to	assess	the	validity	of	these	scales.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 so,	 we	 perform	 a	factor	 analysis	 using	 the	 responses	 to	‘service’	 and	 the	 ‘conflict	 of	 interest’	scenarios	 and	 we	 then	 proceed	 to	correlate	 the	 scores	 generated	 by	 the	factor	 analysis	 with	 the	 scores	 in	 the	
additive	 scale.	 Both	 correlations	 yield	 a	strong,	positive,	and		statistically	Pearson	coefficient	 (r	 =	 1.0;	 sig.	 =	 .000)	 which	means	 that	 the	 scores	 generated	 by	 the	additive	scales	are	cross	validated	by	the	estimates	 of	 factor	 analysis.	 And,	 from	 a	substantive	 point	 of	 view,	 they	 support	the	 claim	 that	 the	 ethical	 world	 of	Indonesian.
	
Figure	1	
Service:	Additive	scale	v	Service_factor	
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Figure	2	
Conflict	of	Interest:	Additive	scale	v	Conflict_factor	
	
	
	 By	 combining	 these	 two	dimensions	 we	 generate	 a	 map	 of	 the	ethical	 preferences	 and	 ethical	 types	 in	the	Indonesia	Parliament.	Before	doing	so	we	 need	 to	 say	 a	 few	 words	 about	 how	this	 mapping	 was	 done	 in	 the	 past	 and	about	how	we	think	it’d	instead	be	done.	When	 Mancuso	 (1995)	 developed	the	 typology	 that	was	 later	 employed	 by	Pelizzo	 and	 Ang	 (2008),	 she	 identified	four	types	of	individuals:	1. The	 Puritans	 who	 have	 low	tolerance	 for	 both	 constituency	service	and	conflict	of	interest;		2. The	Entrepreneurs	who	have	high	tolerance	on	both	dimensions		3. The	 Servants	 who	 have	 high	tolerance	 for	 constituency	 service,	but	not	for	conflict	of	interest		4. The	 Muddlers	 who	 have	 high	tolerance	 for	 conflict	 of	 interest,	but	not	for	constituency	service	When	Mancuso	 (1995)	 performed	her	 analysis	 she	 found	 that	 some	
members	 of	 parliaments	 were	 puritans,	some	 were	 entrepreneurs,	 some	 were	servant	 and	 some	were	muddlers	 (Allen:	2008).	 	 A	 similar	 finding	 was	 presented	by	Pelizzo	and	Ang	(2008).		The	 finding,	 to	 some	 extent,	 was	the	 result	 of	 the	 methodology	 employed	to	segment	the	sample.	Both	studies	used	the	 sample	mean	 as	 the	 cut	 off	 point	 on	each	dimension,	and	since	a	mean	cannot	be	 computed	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 below	average	and	above	average	observations,	it	 is	not	 at	 all	 surprising	 that	 those	early	studies	 found	 that	 there	 are	 some	observations	 in	 each	 of	 the	 four	categories	 generated	 by	 using	 the	dimensional	means	as	cut	off	points.	We	believe	 instead	 that	 instead	of	following	Mancuso’s	approach	is	better	to	take	 the	 neutral	 position	 on	 each	dimension		as	the	cut	off	point	because	in	this	way	we	do	not	create	categories	that	a	priori	will	be	 filled	by	at	 least	one	case	and	 we	 can	 actually	 generated	 a	 more	
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precise	 and	 efficient	 categorization	 and	mapping	 of	 the	 ethical	 world	 of	 Indonesian	MPs.	
	
Figure	3	
A	New	Map	of	Indonesian	MPs	
	
	What	 this	 mapping	 illustrates	 is	the	 fact	 that	 among	 Indonesian	Legislators	 there	 are	 some	 Puritans	 and	Muddlers,	 some	 Entrepreneurs	 and	 very	few	 Servants.	 Specifically,	 there	 were	 2	borderline	 cases	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	occupied	the	neutral	position	on	one	axis	or	 both	 and	 could	 not,	 henceforth,	 be	properly	assigned	 to	any	category.	There	were	 then	2	servants,	4	entrepreneurs,	9	muddlers	and	23	puritans	(Orazbekova and 
Shegirbayev: 2017). 	
 
Ethical	attitudes:	the	correlates	The	 data	 presented	 so	 far	 have	shown	 that	 respondents	 in	 2009	 had	 on	average	 more	 tolerance	 for	 both	 service	and	conflict	of	interest	scenarios	than	the	respondents	 surveyed	 in	 2006.	 As	 we	noted	 before	 there	 is	 a	 difference	between	 these	 two	 sets	 of	 respondents.	While	 they	 were	 all	 elected	 in	 the	 same	
legislature,	 there	 are	 some	 differences	between	 the	 2006	 and	 the	 2009	respondents.	The	2006	respondents	were	serving	 on	 the	 ethics	 committee	 of	 the	DPD	or	the	DPR,	while	all	the	respondents	in	 2009	were	 from	 the	DPR	 and	 none	 of	them	served	on	the	ethics	committee.		Does	 membership	 in	 the	 ethics	committee	 matter?	 To	 answer	 this	question	 we	 perform	 some	 gamma	correlation	 between	 membership	 in	 the	ethics	 committee	 and	 whether	respondents	 regarded	 a	 scenario	 as	corrupt	or	not.		In	two	cases	(school,	influence	job)	out	 of	 8,	 membership	 in	 the	 ethics	committee	 does	 make	 a	 difference	 and	increased	 the	 probability	 that	 these	scenarios	are	regarded	as	corrupt	ones.	In	the	other	cases,	membership	in	the	ethics	committee	 does	 not	 make	 a	 difference.	(See	table	6	and	7).	
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Table	6	
Gamma	correlation.	Affiliation,	Conflict	and	Service	Scenarios		 Retainer	 School	 Influence	job	 Contract	 Secretary	 Gift	 Travel		 Pass	Affiliation	in	 Ethics	Committee	 .232		 .803*		 .769*		 .273			 .226		 -.466		 .545		 .333		Affiliation	in	the	DPD	 -.01	 .78*	 .32	 .17	 -.19	 -.51	 .70	 1.0	N	 34	 35	 36	 34	 37	 32	 32	 31	Legend:	**	significant	at	the	0.5	level	
	
Table	7	
Logit	Models	(sig.)	Logit	 constant	 Affiliation	 in	the	 ethics	committee	School	 .182	(.763)	 2.216	(.020)	Influence	job	 .000	(1.0)	 2.037	(.021)	
	Do	 members	 of	 the	 DPD	 have	 a	lower/higher	 tolerance	 for	 corruption	than	the	members	of	the	DPR?.		The	 evidence	 in	 this	 regard	 is	mixed	 because	 on	 some	 scenarios	members	of	 the	DPR	(retainer,	 secretary,	gift)	 were	 more	 inclined	 than	 the	members	 of	 the	 DPD	 to	 consider	 the	scenarios	as	corrupt,	while	they	were	less	inclined	 to	 do	 so	 on	 other	 scenarios	(school,	 influence	 job,	 contract,	 travel,	pass)	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	gamma	 correlations	 yield	 negative	coefficients	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 retainer,	secretary	 and	 gift	 scenarios,	 while	 the	they	yield	positive	coefficients	otherwise.	But,	 more	 importantly,	 the	 evidence	 is	mixed	 because	 with	 one	 exception	 -the	gamma	 correlation	 between	 school	 and	membership	 in	 the	 DPD	 –	 all	 the	 other	coefficients	 are	 statistically	 insignificant,	which	means	that,	from	a	statistical	point	
of	 view,	 there	 is	no	 significant	difference	in	 whether	 is	 treated	 as	 corrupt	 or	 not	depending	on	whether	 the	 respondent	 is	a	member	of	the	DPD	or	the	DPR.		
Cognitive	Guidance	Previous	 studies	 (Mancuso,	 1995;	Pelizzo	 and	Ang	 2008a;	 Pelizzo	 and	Ang,	2008b)	 reported	 that	 ethical	 attitudes	provided	some	kind	of	cognitive	guidance	in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 position	 a	respondent	 took	 on	 a	 given	 issue	provided	 an	 indication	 of	 where	 that	respondent	would	stand	with	regard	to	a	different	issue.	This	 conclusion	was	 supported	by	the	 fact	 that	 respondents’	 attitudes	 or	positions	 on	 certain	 issues	 (scenarios)	were	strongly,	positively	and	significantly	correlated	 with	 their	 position	 on	 other	issues/scenarios.	Our	 findings,	 presented	in	 table	 8,	 sustain	 a	 similar	 conclusion.	
I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	
Pelizzo,	Omarov.	Ethical	Values	And	The	Perception	Of	Corruption	
	 	 	 	79	
Respondents	 use	 consistently	 their	ethical	standards,	so	that	their	stances	on	an	 issue	 are	 strongly	 related	 to	 their	stances	on	a	different	 issue.	For	instance,	the	responses	on	the	retainer	scenario	are	a	 strong	 and	 significant	 predictor	 of	 a	respondent’s	 assessment	of	 the	 influence	job,	secretary,	gift	and	pass	scenario.		A	 respondent’s	 position	 on	 the	school	 scenario	 is	 a	 strong	 predictor	 of	her	position	on	the	influence	job,	contract,	travel	and	pass	scenario.		
The	responses	on	the	influence	job	scenario	 are	 good	 predictors	 of	respondents’	 position	 on	 the	 contract,	secretary	 and	 pass	 scenario.	 Responses	on	 the	 secretary	 scenario	 are	 good	predictors	 of	 the	 responses	 on	 the	 gift	and	 the	 travel	 scenario,	 while	 responses	on	 contract	 provide	 a	 good	 prediction	 of	respondents’	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 pass	scenario.	 For	 additional	 details	 see	 table	8.	
	
Table	8	
Correlations	for	Conflict	and	Service	Scenarios	(sig.)	Scenario	 Retainer	 School	 Influence	job	 Contract	 Secretary	 Gift	 Travel		 Pass	Retainer	 1	 .179	(.270)	 .336*	(.034)	 .158	(.331)	 .557**	(.000)	 .388*	(.013)	 .266	(.102)	 .358*	(.030)	School	 	 1	 .549**	(.000)	 .381*	(.015)	 .227	(.159)	 .019	(.909)	 .492**	(.001)	 .471**	(.003)	Influence	job	 	 	 1	 .381*	(.015)	 .395*	(.012)	 .218	(.177)	 .158	(.336)	 .484**	(.002)	Contract	 	 	 	 1	 .122	(.452)	 -.052	(.750)	 .277	(.088)	 .334*	(.044)	Secretary	 	 	 	 	 1	 .343*	(.030)	 .318*	(.048)	 .292	(.080)	Gift	 	 	 	 	 	 1	 .087	(.598)	 .220	(.190)	Travel	 	 	 	 	 	 	 1	 		The	data	we	have	collected	on	the	ethical	attitudes	of	 Indonesian	MPs	allow	us	to	perform	another	set	of	analyses	and	test	 whether	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 ethical	attitudes	 are	 responsible	 for	 how	 a	respondent	 perceives	 the	 level	 of	corruption	in	the	country.	Since	 all	 respondents	 are	Indonesian	MPs	and	since	the	(real)	level	of	 corruption	 in	 the	 country	 (Indonesia)	is	 the	 same,	 differences	 in	 the	 perceived	level	 of	 corruption	may	 be	 a	 function	 of	what	could	be	regarded	as	 the	subjective	factors	such	as	respondents’	values,		
	attitudes,	 expectations,	 worldview,	ideology	 and	 so	 on.	 The	 data	 at	 our	disposal	 allow	 us	 to	 test	 a	 specific	relationship,	 namely	 that	 between	 the	perceived	 level	 of	 corruption	 on	 the	 one	hand	 and	 respondents’	 positions	 on	 the	service	 and	 the	 conflict	 of	 interest	dimensions.		Interestingly,	 the	 regression	analysis	 reveals	 that	 attitudes	 towards	service	 are	 a	 reasonably	 strong,	 positive	and	 significant	 predictor	 of	 the	 level	 of	perceived	 corruption	 and	 explain	 about	11	per	cent	of	the	variance	in	the	level	of	
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perceived	 corruption,	 whereas	 attitudes	towards	 conflict	 of	 interest	 scenarios	have	 an	 insignificant	 influence	 on	 how	 much	 corruption	 one	 perceives	(Orazbekova and Shegirbayev: 2017). See	table	9.		
Table	9	
Regression	model:	service,	conflict	of	interest	and	perceived	corruption	(sig.)		 Intercept	 Service	 Conflict	of	interest	 R-squared	Perceived	corruption	 1.94	(.009)	 .50	(.040)	 	 .11	Perceived	corruption	 2.29	(.010)	 	 .28	(.218)	 .04	
	How	 does	 the	 ethical	 world	 of	Indonesian	 parliamentarians	 compare	 to	the	 ethical	 world	 of	 	 	 legislators	 and	policy	 makers	 from	 other	 jurisdictions?	To	answer	this	question	we	will	compare	
the	 responses	 of	 civil	 servants	 from	 the	Kazakhstani	Ministry	 of	 Investments	 and	Development	 who	 participated	 in	 a	survey	 conducted	 by	 Orazbekova	 and	Shegirbayev	(2017).		
Table	10	
Descriptive	statistics.	Indonesia	MPs	v	Kazakhstani	civil	servants		 Civil	servants	from	MID-Kazakshtan	 Indonesian	MPs		 Mean	 	School	 1.85	 2.68	Contract	 1.70	 2.53	Influence	Job	 1.88	 2.90	Travel	 3.29	 4.23	Pass	 3.08	 2.46	Gift	 2.73	 4.23	Retainer	 3.76	 4.60	Secretary	 2.76	 2.95		The	 comparison	 of	 the	 responses	provided	 by	 the	 Kazakhstani	 civil	servants	and	the	Indonesian	MPs	suggests	three	considerations.	First,	 that	generally	speaking	 Indonesian	 MPs	 have	 higher	tolerance	 for	 unethical	 behavior	 than	Kazakhstani	civil	servants.		Only	 in	 one	 case	 (secretary)	 the	Indonesian	responses	are	nearly	identical	to	 the	 ones	 provided	 by	 Kazakhstani	respondents	 and	 only	 in	 one	 case	 (pass)	Indonesian	 MPs	 displayed	 less	 tolerance	than	 Kazakhstani	 civil	 servants.	 Second,	that	 respondents	 in	 both	 countries	 tend	
to	 have	 slightly	 more	 tolerance	 for	conflict	 of	 interest	 scenarios	 than	 for	service	scenarios.	Third,	that	the	attitudes	towards	 service	 scenarios	 affect	 the	perception	 of	 corruption	 of	 both	Indonesian	 and	 Kazakhstani	 elites	(Orazbekova	 and	 Shegirbayev,	 2017),	while	 the	 attitudes	 toward	 conflict	 of	interest	 scenarios	 do	 not	 influence	 the	level	 of	 perceived	 corruption	 in	 either	country.	Or,	to	turn	this	issue	around,	one	could	 say	 that	 in	 Indonesia	 and	Kazakhstan	 the	 level	 of	 perceived	corruption	 depends	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 on	
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the	 tolerance	 respondents	 have	 for	unethical	service	scenarios.		The	 regression	 analyses,	presented	in	table	9,	revealed	that	a	little	more	 than	11	per	 cent	 in	 the	variance	 in	the	 level	 of	 perceived	 corruption	 in	Indonesia	 is	 explained	 by	 respondents’	ethical	 attitudes.	When	we	 regressed	 the	
level	 of	 perceived	 corruption	 against	respondents’	 attitudes	 towards	 service	scenarios,	 we	 find	 (see	 table	 11)	 that	 in	Kazakhstan	 roughly	 45	 per	 cent	 of	 the	variance	 in	 the	 level	 of	 perceived	corruption	 is	 explained	 by	 respondents’	ethical	attitudes.	
	
Table	11		
Ethical	attitudes	and	perception	of	Corruption	in	Kazakhstan		 Intercept	 Service	 Conflict	 of	interest	 R-squared	Perceived	corruption	 1.29	(.004)	 .93	(.000)	 	 .45	
	The	 results	 of	 the	 regression	analyses,	 presented	 in	 tables	 9	 and	 11,	show	 that	 ethical	 values	 do	 not	 provide	simply	 cognitive	 (and	 possibly	behavioral)	 guidance,	 as	 we	 have	 shown	above,	but	they	also	provide	respondents	with	 what	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	‘perceptual	 filters’	 through	 which	respondents	 look	 at	 reality.	 The	perception	 of	 reality,	 the	 perception	 of	how	 much	 corruption	 there	 is	 in	 the	country,	does	not	reflect	just	the	objective	or	 real	 amount	 of	 corruption	 but	 it	 also	reflects	the	biases,	the	‘perceptual	filters’,	the	expectations,	the	ethical	attitudes,	the	dispositions	 of	 the	 respondent.	 This	 is	why,	 as	 our	 data	 analysis	 has	 revealed,	Indonesian	(or	Kazakhstani)	respondents	with	 different	 ethical	 attitudes	 and	standards	 provide	 a	 very	 different	indication	of	how	much	 corruption	 there	is	 in	 their	 own	 country.	 Ethical	 values	 in	other	words	 account	 for	 a	 portion	of	 the	variance	 in	 the	 level	 of	 perceived	corruption.But,	as	our	data	have	revealed,	elites	 from	 different	 countries	 also	 have	different	 ethical	 attitudes	 and	 standards.	The	 fact	 that	 ethical	 standards	 vary	
across	 countries,	 that	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	citizens/respondents	 from	 one	 country	have	 higher	 (or	 lower)	 tolerance	 for	unethical	 behavior	 than	 the	 citizens	 of	another	 country	means	 that	 the	 analysis	of	 survey	 data	 	 (on	 corruption)	 could	generated	very	different	estimates	of	how	much	corruption	there	is	in	each	country,	even	if,	hypothetically,	both	countries	had	exactly	the	same	amount	of	corruption.	We	believe,	hence,	that	in	order	to	estimate	 more	 properly	 the	 level	 of	perceived	 corruption	 on	 the	 basis	 of	survey	data,	it	is	essential	to	discount	the	ethical	 standards	 of	 the	 respondent	which,	 as	 we	 have	 argued,	 vary	 both	within	 countries	 as	 well	 as	 across	countries.		
Conclusion	The	 purpose	 of	 the	 present	 study	was	 to	 analyze	 the	 ethical	 standards	 of	Indonesian	 MPs	 to	 validate	 the	 findings	reported	in	previous	studies	by	assessing	the	 ethical	 attitudes	 of	 Indonesian	 MPs,		by	 mapping	 the	 ethical	 preferences	 of	Indonesian	 MPs,	 and	 by	 understanding	whether	and	to	what	extent	 these	ethical	
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attitudes	 provide	 Indonesian	parliamentarians	 with	 some	 kind	 of	cognitive	 guidance.	 But	 in	 addition	 to	replicating	 the	 analyses	 performed	 in	previous	studies	with	a	larger	sample,	the	paper	 explored	 three	 sets	 of	 questions	that	previous	studies	had	not	addressed.		First,	 we	 explored	what	 are	 some	of	the	correlates	or	some	possible	causes	of	 individual	 attitudes;	 Second,	 we	assessed	 how	 the	 ethical	 attitudes	 and	standards	 of	 respondents	 shape	 the	way	they	 perceive	 corruption;	 Third,	 we	performed	 a	 similar	 analysis	 with	 data	collected	 among	 Kazakhstani	 civil	servants	to	test	whether	the	perception	of	corruption	 is	 influenced	 by	 ethical	attitudes	also	outside	Indonesia	or	not.	In	 the	 first	 respect	 we	 found	 that	while	 there	 is	 no	 real,	 detectable	difference	 between	 the	 ethical	 standards	of	 the	members	 of	 the	DPR	 and	 those	 of	the	members	 of	 the	 DPD,	 the	 fact	 that	 a	parliamentarian	 serves	 on	 the	 ethics	committee	 affects	 her	 tolerance	 towards	some	 ethics	 scenarios.	 In	 the	 second	respect,	 we	 found	 that	 the	 ethical	standards	 of	 the	 Indonesian	 MPs	 have	 a	considerable	 influence	 on	 how	 they	(individually)	 perceive	 the	 level	 of	corruption	in	the	country.		In	the	third	respect,	we	found	that	ethical	 attitudes	 of	 Kazakhstani	respondents	 shape	 how	 they	 perceive	corruption	and	we	actually	 found	that,	 in	the	Kazakhstani	case,	ethical	attitudes	are	an	 even	 stronger	 and	 more	 significant	determinant	 of	 the	 perceived	 level	 of	corruption	than	they	are	in	Indonesia.	The	 evidence	 presented	 here	sustains	 the	 claim	 that	 ethical	 values	matter	 (as	 they	 provide	 unequivocal	cognitive	 guidance	 and	 they	 shape	 the	
way	in	which	reality	is	looked	at)	and	that	in	 order	 to	 make	 a	 better	 use	 of	 survey	data	 to	 estimate	 how	 much	 (perceived)	corruption	 there	 is	 in	 one	 country,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 necessary	 to	 discount	 the	impact	of	ethical	attitudes	and	values.	One	 of	 the	 most	 interesting,	puzzling,	 results	 of	 this	 investigation	 is	that	 perception	 of	 corruption	 is	influenced	 by	 attitudes	 towards	 service	scenarios	 but	 not	 by	 those	 towards	conflict	 of	 interest.	 The	 data	 at	 our	disposal	 do	 not	 allow	 to	 investigate	why	that	may	be	the	case,	but	this	is	a	question	that	 scholars	 may	 wish	 explore	 in	 an	effort	 to	 expand	 the	 boundaries	 of	inquiry.		
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